Blog #7: Postmodernity and the diminution of science

What postmodern thought has done to science is revolutionary. It has successfully cut down to size what was hitherto a monolithic system of generating and propagating knowledge in vogue since Newton—a system that was itself a revolution against a pre-scientific but also monolithic belief system based on Church authority. In the postmodern world, everything is in question, including long-held scientific beliefs and prescriptions.

What it has brought about is a more inclusive notion of science, or a science that is not strictly speaking demarcated between the hard and soft sciences. Arriving at a consensus is “outmoded” and even suspect, says Lyotard. We now see natural scientists cooperating with social scientists in undertaking localized studies, for example. Environmentalists would readily acknowledge that natural science won’t be enough to explain environmental degradation; a socioeconomic survey of the community would have to be conducted to get the full context of the problem.

Within the social sciences themselves, we see a movement away from pure quantification and toward mixed methodologies. There is recognition that mathematical modelling cannot fully capture the complexity of human behavior, in which case qualitative methodologies like unstructured interviews will be more appropriate. The social sciences are not exact. To demand rigor of all research in the field, in my view, unjustifiably excludes valid analysis of the human condition drawn from non-probabilistic data gathering processes. This is dogma that needs to be dethroned in academia.

This is not to say, however, that “anything goes.” Science may no longer be the imposing edifice it once was, but it remains a logic behind the knowledge-creation process. Hollinger in fact makes it clear that “Coming to terms with postmodernism does not mean throwing out everything in the classic body of writings, but finding ways to make old and new ideas work together in specific contexts.” 

And unless postmodernism finds a place in the social sciences, the social sciences risk irrelevance and even their very existence, he warns.

Ironically, what bestows the postmodernist view of science its potency is at the same time the source of its weakness. It can shout down views that have the audacity to lay claim to authority and the ability to set the norm. It can speak out confidently against intellectual hegemony, undermining its proponents by dissecting their motivations and exposing their internal politics and hidden biases. It can deconstruct.

It is, however, but one “-ism” in an entire section of “-isms” in the wide open marketplace of ideas. On the one hand it can pull the rug from under a very comfortable and established norm. On the other, it can be dismissed as an agent of anarchy and therefore dangerous.

The issues raised by postmodernism on the practice of science, as Hollinger points out, are here to stay. But so are long-held and revered beliefs, practices, alliances, prejudices. Valid or not, these will continue to stand in the way of movements to abolish traditions, reconstruct society, and redefine human institutions.

Skeptics should thus not be begrudged for perceiving science as being used to pursue political ends, in the same way that these political actors are free to debunk and dismiss what they might also perceive to be a misuse of science. Science can be used by competing political actors for their pet agendas, some of which are extreme and radical. Fortunately the public now has a greater capacity to make such distinctions. It is now a battle for hearts and minds. It might have always been.